Public Entities Become a Model Against Age Discrimination: Expanding the Definition of  Employer  in \u3cem\u3eGuido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District\u3c/em\u3e by Weston, Kathryn
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 9 Electronic Supplement Article 16
4-11-2018
Public Entities Become a Model Against Age
Discrimination: Expanding the Definition of
"Employer" in Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District
Kathryn Weston
Boston College Law School, kathryn.weston@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathryn Weston, Public Entities Become a Model Against Age Discrimination: Expanding the Definition of "Employer" in Guido v. Mount
Lemmon Fire District, 59 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 279 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss9/16
  
279 
PUBLIC ENTITIES BECOME A MODEL 
AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION: 
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF 
“EMPLOYER” IN GUIDO v. MOUNT 
LEMMON FIRE DISTRICT 
Abstract: In Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, the Ninth Circuit split with 
four other circuits in its understanding of the definition of employer under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). For decades, the other cir-
cuits found that the ADEA’s definition of employer excluded both private and 
public entities that did not meet the statute’s numerosity requirement of twenty or 
more employees. The Ninth Circuit broke with this interpretation and found that 
the ADEA’s numerosity requirement was applicable only to private entities. This 
ruling established that employing fewer than twenty people does not exempt a 
public entity employer from the ADEA’s ban on age discrimination – a decision 
that expands the ADEA’s protection a whole new class of employees. The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision took an ambiguous statute and forced clarity from its text, in 
contrast to the prior circuits’ rulings that found the statute ambiguous on its face 
and forced clarity from the legislative history. Ultimately, it is Congress’s role to 
refine this statute, so employers and employees can be clear on their duties and 
rights with respect to age discrimination in the employment setting. 
INTRODUCTION 
Two firefighters, John Guido and Dennis Rankin, worked for nine years 
for the Mount Lemmon Fire District (“Fire District”), a political subdivision of 
the state of Arizona.1 Over the years, they rose from low-level emergency 
medical technicians to firefighter Captains.2 In 2009, the Fire District termi-
nated the employment of both men.3 At the ages of forty-six and fifty-four, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 
WL 1037578 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 17-587). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) does not define “political subdivision.” 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2012). In the labor context, howev-
er, the term “political subdivision” is generally understood to refer to entities “that are either (1) creat-
ed directly by the state, so as to constitute departments or administrative arms of the government, or 
(2) administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general electorate.” 
NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cty., 402 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1971). The Fire District’s status 
as a political subdivision was not challenged in Guido. 859 F.3d at 1168. 
 2 Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 2, 
Guido, 859 F.3d 1168 (No. 15-15030) [hereinafter EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 3 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1169. 
280 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
they had to re-enter the job market.4 Plaintiffs Guido and Rankin ultimately 
filed a lawsuit, Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (“ADEA”), asserting that the Fire District had 
based its decision solely on age.5  
Age bias is not a new issue, however, and protections against it were en-
acted decades ago.6 Employment discrimination law seeks to minimize em-
ployment decisions that disadvantage members of particular social groups 
without adequate justification.7 Sex, age, race, religion and disability status are 
all major protected classes.8 In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act to address discrimination against older employees – a pre-
viously unprotected class under the first major employment discrimination law, 
Title VII.9 The ADEA is the single most important legal mechanism for em-
ployees to seek reparation for employment-related age discrimination.10 Con-
stitutional provisions, state discrimination laws and common law also provide 
protection from age discrimination and are often used to fill gaps in the 
ADEA’s reach.11  
This comment will address the ADEA, the 1974 amendment made to the 
statute in an attempt to expand coverage to public entities, and the circuit split 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. When older people attempt to reenter the age biased job market, they spend comparatively 
longer than younger people looking for work and receive fewer invitations to interview than younger 
people. BRUCE EVAN BLAINE, UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DIVERSITY 183 (2d ed. 2012). 
 5 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1169. 
 6 Jeremy J. Glenn & Katelan E. Little, A Study of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, GP SOLO, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 41, 41. In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA in response to find-
ings of pervasive age bias in the American workplace. Id. One of the most common age biases is that 
older people do not make good employees because productivity and competence decline with old age. 
HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 1:4 (2d ed. 2017); see Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 
U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating that the very essence of age discrimination can be seen in cases where 
an older person is fired simply because an employer believes old age affects their job capabilities). 
Studies have found that these kinds of stereotypes lead to older employees’ exclusion from trainings, 
diminishing of skills, and ultimately premature exits from the workforce. Libby Brooke & Philip Tay-
lor, Older Workers and Employment: Managing Age Relations, 25 AGEING & SOC’Y 415, 426 (2005). 
 7 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW 1 (4th ed. 2012). 
 8 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 12101 (2012); ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 7. 
 9 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Glenn & Little, supra note 6, at 41. 
 10 EGLIT, supra note 6, § 10:1. 
 11 Id. Constitutionally based age discrimination claims have rarely been successful, often failing 
on the governmental actor issue. Id. § 10:2. A vast majority of states have also adopted age discrimi-
nation laws, mirroring the ADEA, to provide another statutory cause of action under which employees 
can seek redress. Id. § 11:69. Although the statutory protection afforded by the ADEA and state dis-
crimination laws is generally broad enough to cover most cases of employment-related age discrimi-
nation, there are some limits to its reach. Id. § 10:30. In this case, common law causes of action, par-
ticularly breach of contract and tortious interference, are used to fill the gap. Id. § 10:30; see Bernstein 
v. Aetna Life & Cas., 843 F.2d 359, 366–67 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing summary judgment of an em-
ployee’s breach of contract and tortious interference claims that were brought in addition to statutory 
claims under the ADEA and Title VII). 
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created by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire 
District.12 Section I introduces the ADEA, presents the clarity issue that was 
created by the 1974 amendment to the ADEA, and discusses how multiple cir-
cuit courts of appeal have resolved the clarity issue.13 Section II discusses the 
circuit split that was created in 2017 by the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Guido v. 
Mount Lemmon Fire District.14 Finally, Section III will analyze the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision and address how it forced clarity from a statute that had been 
rightfully considered ambiguous for decades.15 This comment ultimately con-
cludes that both the text of the statute and its legislative history are ambiguous, 
and the only appropriate way to resolve this ambiguity is through Congress.16  
I. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, THE 1974 
AMENDMENT, AND THE GREAT DEBATE OVER  
THE NUMEROSITY REQUIREMENT 
This Part introduces the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, its 1974 
Amendment extending coverage to public entities and the debate that has en-
sued regarding whether the amendment restricted coverage of public entities to 
only those with a threshold number of employees.17 Section A presents the 
creation of the ADEA, starting with the influence of Title VII in 1964.18 Sec-
tion B discusses the 1974 Amendment to the ADEA’s definition of “employ-
er,” which extended the ADEA’s coverage to public entities but did not clarify 
if the numerosity requirement applied to this new group.19 Section C presents 
the four prior circuit court of appeals cases that found the ADEA’s definition 
of “employer” to be ambiguous and relied on legislative history to show that 
the statute’s intent was to apply the numerosity requirement to public enti-
ties.20 Finally, Section D introduces the factual and procedural history of the 
case at issue, Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District.21 
A. The Creation of the ADEA 
Protection against age discrimination has its roots in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.22 Title VII was intended to prevent discrimination on the 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 17–132, and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–77, and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 78–109, and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 110–132, and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 110–132, and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 17–77, and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 22–34, and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 35–43, and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 44–64, and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 65–77, and accompanying text. 
 22 Glenn & Little, supra note 6, at 4; see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 & n.12 (1978) (de-
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basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.23 While drafting and de-
bating Title VII, Congress considered incorporating age discrimination into the 
legislation, but ultimately chose not to include age as a protected class.24 Con-
gress, however, continued to investigate and debate age discrimination for 
three years following Title VII’s passage.25 This process brought to light statis-
tical evidence of employment-related age discrimination, which indicated that 
older Americans were excluded and forced out of the workforce at dispropor-
tionate rates.26 Beyond illuminating statistics on the difficulties faced by older 
workers, the congressional investigation into age discrimination in employment 
also exposed the burden the state laws had on businesses.27 National businesses, 
such as airline companies, were subject to conflicting state age discrimination 
laws that complicated the hiring, firing, and benefits of employees.28  
                                                                                                                           
termining that Title VII and the ADEA are fundamentally similar in their aims and substantive prohi-
bitions, and recognizing mirroring language in the two statutes). 
 23 Glenn & Little, supra note 6, at 42. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress issued a directive to the Secretary of 
Labor  requiring the Secretary to complete a study of factors of age discrimination in employment and 
the consequences of this discrimination on the economy and individuals. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265–66 (1964). Within a year, Secretary Wirtz presented his 
report, The Older American Worker, to Congress. WILLIAM WILLARD WIRTZ, THE OLDER AMERICAN 
WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CON-
GRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (June 1965). Amongst other findings, 
the report determined that age discrimination is based on stereotypical assumptions of the abilities of 
older people, which are unsupported by objective facts. Thomas H. Butler & Beth A. Berret, A Gener-
ation Lost: The Reality of Age Discrimination in Today’s Hiring Practices, 9 J. MGMT. & MARKET-
ING RES. 1, 4 (2011). It also found that age discrimination in employment significantly harmed Amer-
ican society because it deprived the economy of labor from capable workers, increased costs of gov-
ernment benefits, and caused economic and psychological detriment to older workers who were de-
nied their productive and satisfying occupations solely due to age. Id. 
 26 Glenn & Little, supra note 6, at 42. Congress heard alarming statistics, such as workers over 
the age of forty-five were barred from one-quarter of all private-sector job openings, those over the 
age of fifty-five were barred from half of all private-sector job openings, and workers over the age of 
sixty-five were barred from almost all private sector job openings. Id. In addition, Employment Ser-
vice offices reported that the average duration of unemployment for males age forty-five to sixty-four 
was over twenty weeks while the average for all males was under fifteen weeks. Age Discrimination 
in Employment: Hearing on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 34 (1967) [hereinafter Age Discrimination Hearing]. 
 27 Age Discrimination Hearing, supra note 26, at 219–20. Employers were unsure which state 
laws covered which employees. Id. at 219; see Glenn & Little, supra note 6, at 43 (discussing the 
confusion for businesses with operations in multiple states and businesses whose employees traveled 
between states). There was uncertainty regarding whether a state’s discrimination laws were applica-
ble to an employee based on where she was hired, where she resided, where she worked or where she 
was fired. Age Discrimination Hearing, supra note 26, at 219. Multistate businesses questioned if it 
was acceptable to treat employees in identical positions differently across different states. Id. 
 28 See Age Discrimination Hearing, supra note 26, at 219–20 (advocating for uniform national 
treatment of age discrimination laws, similar to the Railway Labor Act); Glenn & Little, supra note 6, 
at 43 (“[T]he patchwork of state laws, through its lack of uniformity, created confusion for business-
es.”). The Secretary of Labor described some state laws as being “virtually inoperative” and amount-
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Congress responded to the glaring evidence of the adverse effects of age 
discrimination on both businesses and individuals by passing the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act of 1967.29 The ADEA instituted protections from 
age discrimination that Congress had previously excluded under Title VII.30 
The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination against job applicants and 
employees on the basis of age, protecting those people ages forty and over.31 
This prohibition, however, is only applied to a limited set of employers that 
fall within the ADEA’s definition of “employer,” a definition that is narrower 
than the layman’s meaning of the word.32 The statute’s definition of employer 
includes a threshold minimum number of employees.33 This is known as a nu-
merosity requirement, and it is commonly used in anti-discrimination statutes 
to protect small businesses from burdensome regulation and the destructive 
expense of litigation.34 
B. The 1974 Amendment to the ADEA’s Definition of  
“Employer” and Its Clarity Issue 
In its original 1967 form, the ADEA prohibited age discrimination by pri-
vate-sector companies that employed twenty-five or more employees for twen-
ty or more weeks of the year.35 In 1974, Congress amended the ADEA’s defini-
tion of employer to lower the numerosity requirement from twenty-five or 
more to twenty or more employees.36 The 1974 Amendment also extended the 
                                                                                                                           
ing to “little more than declarations of policy.” Id. at 91. 
 29 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2012). 
 30 See id. § 621(a)(2)–(4) (recognizing that the growing focus on productivity and technological 
skill disadvantaged older workers). 
 31 Id. § 621(b). 
 32 Id. § 630. Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) also restrict the defini-
tion of employer. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b) (exempting employers with less than fifteen employees 
from Title VII’s definition of employer), 12111(5) (exempting employers with less than fifteen em-
ployees from the ADA’s definition of employer). 
 33 29 U.S.C. § 630 
 34 Id. Legislative history demonstrates that the numerosity requirements in Title VII and the 
ADEA were included by Congress to protect small businesses from overregulation and the expense of 
litigation. Thurber v. Jack Reilly’s Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634 (1st Cir. 1983); Brent T. Carney, Part-Time 
Employees Divide the Circuits: An Interpretation of “Employer” Under Title VII and the ADEA, 31 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 167, 170 (1996); see 110 CONG. REC. 13,092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton) 
(“[I]t would lead the Federal Government with all of its power . . . into the way of dealing with a 
small businessman who can ill afford to protect himself . . . .”). 
 35 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11, 81 Stat. 602, 605 
(1967). In 1973, the Senate Special Committee on Aging presented a report, entitled Improving the 
Age Discrimination Law, which found a significant deficiency in the ADEA’s coverage. See STAFF OF 
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, IMPROVING THE AGE DISCRIMINATION LAW, S. DOC. NO. 21-493, at iii, 
11, 14 (1973) [hereinafter REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA)] (stating only about fifty percent of all 
workers between ages forty and sixty-four were protected by the ADEA). 
 36 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 
(1974); see Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170. The Committee reported that thirteen million people age forty to 
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ADEA protections to employees of state and local public entities.37 These 
changes enabled the ADEA to provide age discrimination protections to more 
employees by encompassing more employers under the ADEA’s definition of 
“employer.”38 
The 1974 Amendment to the ADEA raised a new question of clarity.39 
The amended definition of employer consists of two separate sentences.40 The 
first sentence applies to private employers and includes the exclusionary fac-
tors, such as the numerosity requirement.41 The second sentence begins, “The 
term [employer] also means . . .” and adds state and local public entities to the 
definition.42 This alteration of the definition of employer created a question of 
whether the numerosity requirement in the first sentence applied to the public 
entities addressed in the new second sentence.43 
                                                                                                                           
sixty-four were working for entities with fewer than twenty-five employees, and thus were not cov-
ered by the ADEA. REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA, supra note 35, at 14. In 1972, Title VII was 
similarly amended to reduce its numerosity requirement from twenty-five employees to fifteen em-
ployees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 
(1972). 
 37 Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, § 28, 88 Stat. at 74; Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170. 
The Report found that governmental entities employed 5.5 million people between ages forty and 
sixty-four. REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA, supra note 35, at 14. The 1972 Amendment of Title 
VII similarly extended coverage to public entities, extending coverage under Title VII to ten million 
more employees. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 2, 86 Stat. at 103; Milestones in the 
History of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: 1972, E.E.O.C. (Mar. 3, 2018), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1972.html [https://perma.cc/D9YQ-CQMM]. 
 38 REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA, supra note 35, at 18 (stating that an amendment to the 
ADEA reducing the numerosity requirement to twenty or more employees instead of twenty-five 
would result in the protection of 1.3 million additional older workers, as well as make the ADEA 
more consistent with the broader scopes of other labor laws). 
 39 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2012); see Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172 n.6 (recognizing a dispute as to whether 
the numerosity requirement in the first sentence of the definition of employer extends to the second 
sentence); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270–71 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding ambiguity in 
application of the numerosity requirement due to the two-sentence construction of the definition of 
employer under the 1974 Amendment to the ADEA). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). 
 41 Id. (limiting coverage to private entities that are “engaged in an industry affecting commerce” 
and have “twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar 
weeks”). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170; Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270. Courts interpreting Title VII do not have to 
confront a similar ambiguity regarding the definition of “employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(b); Guido, 
859 F.3d at 1172 (noting that the construction of Title VII’s definition of employer is comparatively 
clearer). In amending Title VII, Congress changed the definition of “person” to include government 
entities and political subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172 & n.6. This defini-
tion of person is then used to define the term employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 
1172 & n.6. This structure makes it clear that the fifteen employee numerosity requirement in Title 
VII applies to both public and private entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172 & 
n.7; Kelly, 801 F.2d at 272. 
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C. Decades of Case Law Addressing the Ambiguity of the  
ADEA’s Definition of Employer  
Prior to Guido, four circuit courts of appeal have considered the question 
of whether the numerosity requirement applies to state and local public enti-
ties.44 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
all reached the same conclusion, finding that the statutory language defining 
“employer” was ambiguous.45 They then looked to the legislative history of the 
Amendment and reached the conclusion that the numerosity requirement ex-
tended to public entities.46 
1. The Seventh Circuit Applies the Numerosity Requirement to Public 
Entities in Kelly v. Wauconda Park District 
In 1986, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to consider 
this question in Kelly v. Wauconda Park District.47 The court first looked to the 
plain language of the statute.48 It determined that both parties presented rea-
sonable interpretations of the numerosity requirement as written in the ADEA’s 
definition of employer.49 The employee argued that by including public entities 
in a separate sentence, Congress unambiguously signaled a different category 
of employers.50 This new category was without the numerosity requirement, so 
public entities of any size had to comply with the ADEA.51 In contrast, the 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172; Cink v. Grant Cty., 635 F. App’x 470, 474 n.5 (10th Cir. 2015) (find-
ing the ADEA protected an employee who worked as a jailer and a dispatcher for a county sheriff’s 
office); Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that a 
state-funded nonprofit education corporation fell under the ADEA’s definition of employer); E.E.O.C. 
v. Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that a local township was an employer 
under the ADEA); Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270 (applying the ADEA’s coverage to protect a maintenance 
worker for a local park district from age discrimination). 
 45 Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Monclova, 920 F.2d at 363; Kelly, 801 
F.2d at 271 (finding that ambiguity stems from the fact that the sentence addressing public entities does 
not refer to the numerosity requirement). A statute is ambiguous if has more than one reasonable interpre-
tation and Congress has not explicitly spoken to the issue. Alaska Wilderness League v. E.P.A., 727 F.3d 
934, 938 (9th Cir. 2013); see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or 
ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in 
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”). 
 46 Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Monclova, 920 F.2d at 363; Kelly, 801 
F.2d at 270 (finding that the legislative history shows Congress intended to subject public and private 
entities to the same anti-discrimination rules). 
 47 See Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270 (addressing a maintenance worker’s claim this his employer, a local 
park district with no more than three employees, based its decision to fire him on age). 
 48 Id. at 272. Under the rules of statutory interpretation, when the plain language of a statute is 
clear, the court does not look beyond those words to interpret the statute. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). 
 49 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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employer argued that the 1974 Amendment merely clarified that public entities 
were to be added to the definition of employer under the same qualifications 
already employed by the definition.52 Because the conflicting interpretations 
were both reasonable, the court determined the statute was ambiguous on 
whether the numerosity requirement extended to public entities.53 
Ambiguity of statutory language compels the court to turn to the legisla-
tive history of the statute in order to determine the statute’s meaning from con-
gressional intent.54 In determining intent, the Seventh Circuit gave considera-
tion to the parallel nature of Title VII and its 1972 Amendment, which extend-
ed the definition of employer to cover state and local government entities.55 
This 1972 amendment to Title VII included language explicitly extending the 
numerosity requirement to state and local government entities.56 In contrast, 
although the 1974 ADEA amendment was proposed at the same time Congress 
did not include similarly explicit language in the ADEA.57 The legislative his-
tories of both the ADEA and Title VII amendments suggested the amendments 
were made with some intent to put public and private employers on similar 
footing.58 Because both statutes had similar objectives, substantive prohibi-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. 
 53 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012); Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271; see also Alaska Wilderness League, 727 
F.3d at 938 (“A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”). 
 54 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271; see Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (finding the 
court should look to legislative intent where a statute is ambiguous). 
 55 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271. Because of the parallel nature of Title VII and the ADEA, Courts often 
rely on Title VII to interpret the ADEA. Id. Legislative history suggests that Congress intended the 
two anti-discrimination statutes to be interpreted in a similar manner. Id. During the Title VII hear-
ings, Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, a sponsor of the 1974 ADEA Amendment, stated, “I believe 
that the principles underlying these provisions in the EEOC bill (extending Title VII to public em-
ployers) are directly applicable to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” 118 CONG. REC. 
15,895 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bentsen); Colleen Gale Treml, Zombro v. Baltimore City Police 
Department: Pushing Plaintiffs down the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination Suits, 68 N.C. L. REV. 
995, 1002 & n.66–67 (1990); see E.E.O.C. v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that 
Title VII closely parallels the ADEA and thus, its history is helpful to interpret the ADEA). 
 56 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(b); see supra note 43 (discussing how Congress amended Title VII 
using language that could only be interpreted to apply the numerosity requirement to both public and 
private entities). Title VII first defines a “person” as: “one or more individuals, governments, govern-
mental agencies, political subdivisions, . . . corporations, . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). It then narrows 
the definition of “employer” using this unlimited group of public and private “persons” to only those 
“engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day 
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of 
such a person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (emphasis added). 
 57 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271. Senator Bentsen first proposed an amendment to the ADEA in 1972, 
while Congress was working on amendments to Title VII. Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604; REPORT ON IM-
PROVING THE ADEA, supra note 35, at iii n.1. He proposed it again after the Title VII amendments 
were passed, arguing that the ADEA amendment had similar principles and should get the same sup-
port. Elrod, 674 F.2d at 604–05. 
 58 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271–72 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 8,768 (1974)). Senator Bentsen, a sponsor 
of the ADEA amendment, stated, “[T]he passage of this measure insures that Government employees 
will be subject to the same protections against arbitrary employment [discrimination] based on age as 
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tions, and legislative histories, the Kelly court determined that although the 
ADEA’s definition of employer was ambiguous, the legislative history showed 
that Congress intended to extend the numerosity requirement to public enti-
ties.59 As a result, it affirmed dismissal of the case in favor of the employer 
because the employer the requisite number of employees to be considered an 
employer under the ADEA.60 
2. Three Other Circuits Apply the Findings of the Kelly Court 
In the decades following Kelly, other courts were also faced with the issue 
of whether the ADEA’s numerosity requirement extended to public entities.61 
The Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits all addressed the question, and a consen-
sus was reached.62 These courts agreed with the Kelly court that ADEA’s defi-
nition of employer is ambiguous and used to a legislative intent analysis.63 As 
of June 2017, all circuit courts that had considered the issue were unanimous 
in holding that the numerosity requirement applies to both private and public 
employers because Congress intended to apply identical restrictions to public 
and private entities, and protect all small organizations from the burden of age 
discrimination litigation.64 
D. Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District: The Ninth Circuit Considers  
the Definition of “Employer” Under the ADEA 
John Guido and Dennis Rankin (“Firefighters” or “Plaintiffs”) were both 
hired in 2000 by the Mount Lemmon Fire District (“Fire District” or “Defend-
ant”), a local governmental subdivision of the State of Arizona.65 Both men 
                                                                                                                           
are employees in the private sector.” Id. 
 59 See id. at 272 (finding that when two statutes are significantly parallel in their objectives, histo-
ries and goals, they should be interpreted to have the same meaning). 
 60 Id. at 273. 
 61 Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Monclova, 920 F.2d at 363; Kelly, 801 
F.2d at 270. 
 62 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172; see Cink, 635 F. App’x 470, 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Mon-
clova, 920 F.2d at 362–63; Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270. 
 63 Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Monclova, 920 F.2d at 362–63. Most 
recently, in 2015, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the Cink case, in which the numerosity 
requirement was not a deciding issue. 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5. The court deferred to the findings of 
the other circuit courts on legislative history, addressing the numerosity requirement’s application to 
public entities in only one footnote. Id. 
 64 Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Monclova, 920 F.2d at 363; Kelly, 801 
F.2d at 270. 
 65 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1169. The Fire District has fewer than twenty full-time employees. Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 3, Guido, 859 F.3d 1168 (No. 15-15030). The plaintiffs argued, however, 
that volunteer firefighters and seasonal reserve firefighters count toward the numerosity requirement 
under the ADEA. Id. The district court concluded that volunteers should not be included as employ-
ees. Id. This issue became moot once the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the numer-
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served as full-time firefighter captains for the Fire District.66 On June 15, 2009, 
the Fire District terminated the employment of Guido and Rankin due to 
layoffs.67 At that time, they were the oldest full-time employees.68 Guido was 
forty-six years of age.69 Rankin was fifty-four years of age.70 
The firefighters filed complaints alleging age discrimination against the 
Fire District with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).71 
The EEOC issued separate favorable determinations for each, finding reasona-
ble cause to believe the Fire District violated the ADEA.72 Guido and Rankin 
proceeded to file this lawsuit, Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District, for age 
discrimination under the ADEA in April 2013.73 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted sum-
mary judgment for the Fire District, finding that the Fire District did not quali-
fy as an employer under the ADEA because the department did not meet the 
numerosity requirement.74 Thus, the Fire District’s employees, including Gui-
do and Rankin, were not protected from age discrimination.75 The District 
Court’s analysis was similar to that of the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth 
Circuits, in that it began by determining that the statutory language was am-
biguous and then looked to the perceived congressional intent of the 1974 
Amendment.76 After the district court ruled in favor of the Fire District, the 
Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted 
review.77 
                                                                                                                           
osity requirement did not apply to public entities. Guido, 859 F.3d at 1175. 
 66 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1169; EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 2, at 2. 
 67 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1169; EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 2, at 2. 
 68 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1169. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 1169–70. The EEOC is the agency Congress has tasked with “interpreting, administering, 
and enforcing” federal laws regarding employment discrimination, including the ADEA. EEOC Ami-
cus Curiae Brief, supra note 2, at 1; see 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012). 
 72 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170. These determinations are not binding on either party. What You Can 
Expect After You File a Charge, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, (Mar. 3, 2018) https://
www.eeoc.gov//employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/SDP9-MPAE] [hereinafter EEOC Process]. 
In matters of age discrimination, the plaintiff does not need a Right-to-Sue Notice from the EEOC. Id. 
However, plaintiffs often file with the EEOC first because it can lead to early settlement when the 
EEOC initiates an investigation or facilitates mediation. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (stating that the 
EEOC should attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice by seeking the employer’s voluntary 
compliance). If the EEOC reaches a determination that there is reasonable cause to believe the em-
ployer violated an anti-discrimination law, the EEOC will seek a settlement by the employer. EEOC 
Process, supra. If no settlement is reached, the EEOC will either elect to pursue litigation itself or 
give the complaining party a Right-to-Sue Notice. Id. 
 73 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id.; EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 2, at 3. 
 76 EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 2, at 3. 
 77 Id. at 1 (stating that the issue of whether the numerosity requirement in Section 630(b) applied 
to public entities was a legal question of first impression in this circuit). 
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II. THE GUIDO COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF ADEA’S DEFINITION  
OF EMPLOYER DIVERGES FROM THE CONSENSUS OF  
ITS SISTER CIRCUITS 
On June 19, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision 
in Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District.78 For the first time since the 1974 
ADEA Amendment, a circuit court of appeals found that the language of Sec-
tion 630(b) was not ambiguous and found that the ADEA definition of em-
ployer included public entities with less than twenty employees as employ-
ers.79 This Part discusses how the Ninth Circuit reached that conclusion.80 Sec-
tion A presents the Ninth Circuit’s argument for why the ADEA’s definition of 
“employer” is not ambiguous its coverage of public entities, no matter the 
number of employees they have.81 Section B presents the Ninth Circuit’s cri-
tique of the prior circuits’ use of an unclear legislative history.82  
A. The Ninth Circuit Interprets the Definition of Employer Under  
Section 630(b) of the ADEA as Unambiguous 
In reaching its decision, the court first sought to determine the plain 
meaning of Section 630(b).83 It found that the section was unambiguous in that 
it did not extend any numerosity requirement exemption to public entities.84 
The courts generally do not depart from a statute’s express language when it is 
unambiguous so as to avoid making policy decisions from the bench.85 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 2018 
WL 1037578 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 17-587). 
 79 Id. at 1175; Cink v. Grant Cty., 635 F. App’x 470, 474 n.5 (10th Cir. 2015); Palmer v. Ark. 
Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998); E.E.O.C. v. Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 
360, 363 (6th Cir. 1990); Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 80 See infra notes 83–109, and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 83–97, and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 98–109, and accompanying text. 
 83 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. To determine the plain meaning of a text, courts use tools such as 
dictionary definitions, rules of grammar, and maxims of linguistic construction. H. Drewry Gores, 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Textualism, Intentionalism, the Chevron Doctrine and Judicial Poli-
cy-Making, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 853, 872 (2000). 
 84 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174 (“We need not read minds to read text.”). There are only two instances 
that the courts recognize they should look beyond the text of a statute: ambiguity and absurdity. Lamie v. 
United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); see Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 518 
F.2d 913, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1975) (“[T]his court may look beyond the express language of a statute in 
order to give force to Congressional intent: where the statutory language is ambiguous; and where a lit-
eral interpretation would thwart the purpose of the over-all statutory scheme or lead to an absurd result.”). 
 85 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174; see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939) (“ . . . [c]alling 
for great wariness lest what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation and attempted interpreta-
tion of legislation becomes legislation itself.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 395 (2012) (arguing that when judges say they are 
determining the legislative intent, they are really just themselves legislating where the situation has 
not been provided for by the statute). 
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The Ninth Circuit held that Section 630 creates distinct categories of enti-
ties that qualify as employers under the ADEA.86 The court found that each 
category of employer has its own clarifying language, so the numerosity re-
quirement in the first sentence is not associated with the public entities catego-
ry addressed in the second sentence.87 The Ninth Circuit’s textual analysis ze-
roed in on “also,” as it appears at the beginning of the second sentence (“The 
term also means . . . ”88 The court focused on the dictionary definition of the 
word, finding that it means “in addition; besides” and “likewise; too.”89 The 
court stated that in the context of definitions, the sentence structure used in 
Section 630(b) (X means A. X also means B.) is an indication that an addition-
al, entirely separate definition, is available.90 The Ninth Circuit determined that 
Section 630(b) is not ambiguous and does not include a numerosity require-
ment for public entities.91 It found “also” as a clear linguistic mechanism indi-
cating two separate categories for “employer,” and that the public entity cate-
gory does not incorporate a numerosity requirement.92 
The employer in Kelly asserted that the construction of Section 630(b) 
                                                                                                                           
 86 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. Section 630(a) reads: “The term ‘person’ 
means one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations, business 
trusts, legal representatives, or any organized groups of persons.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(a). Section 630(b) 
reads:  
The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks 
in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers 
having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The term also means 
(1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any 
agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate 
agency, but such term does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by 
the Government of the United States. 
Id. § 630(b) (emphasis added). 
 87 29 U.S.C. § 630; Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. One category was encompassed by the first sentence 
of Section 630(b), and included those persons “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
twenty or more employees for each working day.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. A 
second category of employer was established in the second sentence, addressing state-affiliated enti-
ties as a separate category, with its own separate clarifying language in the second sentence of Section 
630(b). 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. 
 88 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. 
 89 Id.; see Also, WEBSTER’S EIGHTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1973) [hereinafter 
Also, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY]. The plaintiffs, as well as the EEOC in its amicus curiae brief, assert-
ed that the English language provided the statute’s drafters many ways make it clear that the numer-
osity requirement extended to public entities, but none of the possible linguistic tools were used. Gui-
do, 859 F.3d at 1172 & n.6; EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 90 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided an 
example that helps to explain its interpretation. Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171 & nn 4–5. “The password can 
be an even number. The password can also be an odd number greater than one hundred.” Id. These are 
two separate definitions of a possible password. Id. The clarifying language, “greater than one hun-
dred,” applies to only one of the definitions even if the sentences are reversed. Id. 
 91 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174. 
 92 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174. 
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could also be reasonably interpreted as an addendum to the definition of em-
ployer under the same clarifying language, rather than a separate definition for 
a separate category.93 The Ninth Circuit, however, criticized the Kelly v. 
Wauconda Park District opinion for its conclusory finding that this alternative 
interpretation of Section 630(b) was reasonable.94 The court found that none of 
the prior rulings from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth or Tenth Circuits had elabo-
rated on the reasonableness of the alternative interpretation.95 It was just de-
clared to be reasonable.96 Because the Ninth Circuit found only one reasonable 
interpretation of the text of Section 630(b), it declared the definition of em-
ployer to be unambiguous. 97 
B. The Ninth Circuit Denies That the Legislative Intent Behind the 1974 
Amendment Was to Create Equal Footing for Public and Private Entities 
In addition to finding the text unambiguous, the Ninth Circuit proceeded 
to go one step further.98 It then challenged the Kelly court’s finding that the 
statutes should be interpreted to have the same meaning and effect.99 Noting 
the differing language in the statutes, the Ninth Circuit held that if Congress 
had intended the 1974 ADEA amendment to have the same effect as the 1972 
Title VII amendment, Congress would have used the same language.100 The 
Ninth Circuit interpreted Congress’s decision not to do so as evidence that 
Congress had not intended the ADEA to impose a numerosity requirement.101 
                                                                                                                           
 93 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270–71 (introducing the employer’s alternative interpretation as “reasona-
ble” without any further analysis on its reasonableness). 
 94 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1173. 
 95 Id. at 1173 & n.9. The Cink court analyzed the entire issue of alternative interpretations in two 
sentences in the footnote of its opinion, adopting the prior circuits findings without further analysis. 
Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5. The Palmer court only needed one sentence of analysis on the issue, 
adopting the Kelly analysis of the reasonableness of the alternative interpretation in a conclusory man-
ner. Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896 (citing Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270–71). The court in Monclova Township also 
relied on the Kelly court’s determination without adding any further discussion as to why both inter-
pretations were reasonable. Monclova, 920 F.2d at 363. 
 96 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1173; Cink, 635 F. App’x at 474 n.5; Palmer, 154 F.3d at 896; Monclova, 
920 F.2d at 362–63; Kelly, 801 F.2d at 270–71. 
 97 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174. 
 98 See id. (recognizing that the court did not need to address legislative intent because the statute 
was unambiguous, but challenging the prior courts’ findings on legislative intent of the 1974 ADEA 
Amendment anyway). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 272. Both amendments sought to extend coverage to public entities and 
reduce the numerosity requirement. Treml, supra note 55, at 999 & n.45. Despite the identical struc-
ture of Section 2000e (Title VII) and Section 630 (ADEA) and the fact that they were proposed 
around the same time, the amendments did not use the same method for extending coverage. Id. at 
1002; see supra note 43 (discussing how Title VII’s 1972 Amendment clearly extended the numerosi-
ty requirement to public entities). 
 101 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174; see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 351–58 
(2013) (stating that Congress’s choice of words and structural choices are presumed to be deliberate); 
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Furthermore, the Guido court also rejected the Kelly court’s finding of a 
clear intent in the congressional record.102 The court noted that the record was 
sparse and never discussed extending the numerosity requirement to public 
employers.103 The court criticized the Kelly opinion for relying on vague 
statements from the legislative history that only expressed dissatisfaction with 
the discrepancies between public and private sector protections, but did not 
directly discuss extending the numerosity requirement.104 The Ninth Circuit 
also suggested reasonable explanations for why Congress would omit the nu-
merosity requirement for public entities.105 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its choice to follow the widely-
accepted rule that it is not the role of the court to determine the best policy 
outcome.106 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s deci-
sion, refusing to follow the precedent established in the other circuits.107 The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the numerosity requirement did not apply to state-
affiliated entities, and based this conclusion solely on the plain meaning of the 
1974 ADEA Amendment.108 This determination allowed the plaintiffs’ case to 
avoid summary judgment and move forward to determine whether the fire-
                                                                                                                           
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 n.3 (2009) (finding that although Congress amended 
Title VII to include mixed-motive adverse employment actions, it did not make the same amendment 
to the ADEA, thus distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII). 
 102 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174. 
 103 Id.; Kelly, 801 F.2d at 271–72; see E.E.O.C. v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1982) (stat-
ing there is “scant” legislative history for the 1974 ADEA amendment). 
 104 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1175; REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA, supra note 35, at 14, 17–18 
(“[I]t is difficult to see why one set of rules should apply to private industry and varying standards to 
government.”). The Senate report on improving the ADEA refers to the numerosity requirement as a 
“small business exemption,” a term generally used to refer only to private employers with few em-
ployees. REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA, supra note 35, at 14. Additionally, the report always 
addresses the two amendments in separate paragraphs, and they were even originally proposed as 
separate amendments. Id. at 14, 17–18. It is clearly stated, however, that the primary goal of these 
amendments was to extend protection from age discrimination in employment to as many older work-
ers as possible. Id. at 17. 
 105 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1175 n.10. One reason the Ninth Circuit raises is that state-affiliated enti-
ties have a greater ability to bear the burden of lawsuits than small private-sector employers. Id.; see 
also Kelly, 801 F.2d at 272 n.3 (noting that the EEOC had asserted in its amicus brief that the numer-
osity requirement was intended to protect neighborhood small businesses with small incomes from 
government regulations that would threaten their existence); REPORT ON IMPROVING THE ADEA, 
supra note 35, at 14 (referring to statutory numerosity requirements as “small business exemptions”). 
Another explanation for this interpretation of congressional intent is that Congress may have wanted 
the government to be an example of non-discrimination for private-sector employers. Guido, 859 F.3d 
at 1175 n.10. 
 106 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1175; Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2034 (2014) 
(stating that the court has no license to disregard statutory language simply based on the opinion that 
Congress intended something different). 
 107 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1175. 
 108 Id.  
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fighters were in fact victims of age discrimination when their employment was 
terminated.109 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADDS A NEW INTERPRETATION 
This Part challenges the Ninth Circuit’s primary finding in Guido v. Mount 
Lemmon Fire District, but agrees with its criticism of the prior circuits that used 
a scant and unclear legislative history to solve the statute’s ambiguity.110 Section 
A asserts that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly found Section 630(b) to be unambig-
uous.111 Section B, however, supports the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the 
legislative history of the 1974 Amendment to the ADEA is unclear. 112 
A. The ADEA’s Definition of Employer Is Ambiguous 
The Ninth Circuit finds plain meaning and clarity where there is none in 
Section 630(b).113 In determining the plain meaning of the ADEA’s definition 
of employer, the court relied on dictionary definitions and conventions of the 
English language asserted with no clear evidence of certainty in these defini-
tions or purported conventions.114 Dictionaries merely use words to explain 
words, leading to the appearance of a clear and plain meaning even in cases 
where uncertainty exists.115 Particularly for words like “also,” which the Ninth 
Circuit gives great weight, the dictionary does not do much to clarify what it 
means when it is in use.116 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concludes that the other possible interpreta-
tion of Section 630(b) is unreasonable without providing any support for that 
conclusion.117 It seems perfectly reasonable that the second sentence of Section 
                                                                                                                           
 109 Id.  
 110 See infra notes 113–132, and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 113–120, and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 121–132, and accompanying text. 
 113 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012); Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168, 1169 (9th Cir. 
2017), cert. granted, 2018 WL 1037578 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 17-587). 
 114 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171; see A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Con-
text in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 72 (1994) (criticizing citation to 
dictionaries because it conveys only the appearance of certainty in meaning). Because “also” was 
undefined by the statute, it is ascribed its ordinary meaning. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nash-
ville & Davison Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (looking to the dictionary definition of the term “op-
pose” when interpreting Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision because it was not defined in the statute). 
 115 Randolph, supra note 114, at 72 (“Lexicographers define words with words. Words in the 
definition are defined by more words, as are those words . . . . Using a dictionary definition simply 
pushes the problem back.”). 
 116 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171; Also, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 89 (“1. In addition; be-
sides. 2. Likewise; too.”); see Randolph, supra note 114, at 73–74 (“I think [dictionaries] are . . . like 
‘word zoos.’ One can observe an animal’s features in the zoo, but one still cannot be sure how the 
animal will behave in its native surroundings. The same is true of words in a text.”). 
 117 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1171, 1173 (“But, declaring that multiple reasonable interpretations exist 
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630(b) could be interpreted as an addendum to the definition of employer under 
the same clarifying language, rather than a separate definition for a separate cat-
egory.118 There are numerous linguistic mechanisms that could have been used 
to make it clear whether the second sentence addressed public entities as a dis-
tinct category of employer or merely intended public entities to be added to the 
prior definition in as an addendum.119 Congress did not use any of these meth-
ods, and the Ninth Circuit should have recognized the ambiguity this created.120 
B. The Ninth Circuit Appropriately Finds That Congress’s Intent Behind the 
1974 ADEA Amendment to the Definition of Employer Is Unclear 
The Supreme Court has stated that where specific provisions of the 
ADEA are identical to Title VII, the interpretations of Title VII apply equally 
to the ADEA.121 Yet in the present case, the language is not identical despite 
having the same overarching goals of extending coverage to government enti-
ties and lowering the numerosity requirement.122 The Kelly v. Wauconda Park 
District court makes a valid argument that there is no evidence that Congress 
intended the 1974 ADEA Amendment to have a different effect than the 1972 
amendment to Title VII.123 It is entirely possible, however, that a different in-
tent was demonstrated by the use of different language.124 The definition of 
employer in the ADEA and Title VII were identical before they were amended, 
so if the same result was intended both statutes could have had identical 
amendments.125 Although there is a viable argument that Congress may have 
                                                                                                                           
does not make it so.”). 
 118 Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 270–71 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 119 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172; supra note 43 (discussing how Title VII was amended to clearly 
extend the numerosity requirement to public entities). Congress could have used the same language as 
the 1972 Amendment of Title VII. Guido, 859 F.3d at 1172. Congress also could have added the nu-
merosity requirement in the second sentence to make its intent obvious. Id. 
 120 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 85, at 395 (recognizing that it is evident that in most cases 
of ambiguity legislators had “no real intention, one way or another, on the point in question” because 
if they had an intent, they would have made it clear in the text). 
 121 Meghan C. Cooper, Reading Between the Lines: The Supreme Court’s Textual Analysis of the 
ADEA in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 753, 760 (2011); see Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (stating that interpretations of Title VII 
“apply with equal force in the context of age discrimination” when the provision of the ADEA is iden-
tical to Title VII because the language of the ADEA was derived from Title VII). 
 122 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)–(b) (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(b). 
 123 Kelly, 801 F.2d at 272. The Kelly court concluded that just because the language was not iden-
tical did not mean that Congress intended a different meaning for the ADEA amendment than it car-
ried out with the Title VII amendment. Id.; see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating 
that the ADEA’s prohibitions were derived in haec verba from Title VII); E.E.O.C. v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 
601, 608 (7th Cir. 1982) (determining that Title VII is particularly helpful for interpreting the ADEA 
because it is the legislation that most closely parallels the ADEA). 
 124 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 n.3 (2009); see 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)–(b); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(a)–(b). 
 125 Guido, 859 F.3d at 1174. The Supreme Court, however, has also recognized situations in 
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amended both Title VII and the ADEA with the intent to extend the numerosity 
requirement to public entities, there is an equally viable argument that Con-
gress intended a different result, and thus used different language.126 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit accurately critiques the prior circuit courts 
that found a clear intent in the limited congressional record.127 The reports and 
hearings that the Kelly court relied on never addressed the precise issue in 
question – whether the numerosity requirement should apply to public entities 
as well.128 Furthermore, the report addressed the numerosity requirement and 
extending coverage to public entities in separate paragraphs, presenting the 
effects each change would have on its own and never discussing them in com-
bination.129 The Kelly opinion’s only other evidence of legislative intent are 
two floor statements from the Amendment’s sponsoring senator.130 As legisla-
tion is written by multiple authors and subjected to a process negotiation and 
compromise, one individual’s statements should not be held to represent the 
congressional intent behind the statute.131 Just as the Ninth Circuit forced clari-
ty from the text of Section 630(b), the Kelly court forced clarity from a scant 
and ambiguous legislative history.132  
CONCLUSION 
This most recent ruling by the Ninth Circuit is a dramatic departure from 
its sister circuits’ interpretation of the ADEA’s definition of “employer” as 
                                                                                                                           
which a difference between the language of the ADEA and Title VII demonstrates that Congress in-
tended a different meaning. Gross, 557 U.S. at 177 n.3. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the 
Supreme Court heard a case, in which an employee claimed he had been demoted because of his age 
(fifty-four years old). Id. at 170. A key issue in the case was Title VII’s approach to adverse employ-
ment actions based on mixed-motive (permissible and impermissible considerations) and its applica-
bility to an ADEA claim. Id. at 171, 173. The court ultimately found great importance in the fact that 
Congress had amended Title VII to authorize an employee to recover for mixed-motive adverse em-
ployment actions, but never similarly amended the ADEA. Id. at 174 (“Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s 
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amended in 1974. In reading the definition of “employer” under the ADEA to 
apply to state and local entities without any numerosity requirement, the Ninth 
Circuit distinguished Section 630(b) not only from its previous interpretations 
but also from other discrimination laws, which generally carve out an exemp-
tion for small entities who may be crippled by the threat of discrimination liti-
gation. To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found clarity in ambiguous 
statutory language. The Guido court’s policy justifications may be sound: its 
ruling expands the ADEA’s protections to millions of people working for small 
state and local public entities who were previously exempt from the ADEA. 
Nevertheless, the ruling may only give temporary relief. Parties cannot rely on 
Guido’s legal conclusion as it misrepresents clarity in an ambiguous statute 
and out of line with the long history of other circuit decisions. Due to the am-
biguity of the statute, the scarce legislative history on the issue and the dis-
crepancy with the Title VII amendment, it seems most appropriate for this is-
sue to be returned to Congress to determine whether the numerosity require-
ment should be extended to public entities.  
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